Indefinite provisional suspensions and competence under the FFAR: CAS Panel reinstates suspended agent licence in Tullio Tinti v FIFA

The latest case involving the FIFA Football Agent Regulations (FFAR)^[1] raises the question of how far can FIFA enforce the FFAR when the judicial body designated to take final decisions is not operational.

This article examines the decision of the CAS panel in CAS 2025/A/11173 Tullio Tinti v FIFA^[2] not to revisit the case afresh (de novo), and what practical steps FIFA could make going forward when taking disciplinary action against FIFA-licensed agents.

Introduction

In CAS 2024/A/10918 Beckett v FIFA^[3], the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) panel addressed the extent to which FIFA could enforce the FIFA Football Agent Regulations (FFAR)^[4] while key provisions of its disciplinary framework remain suspended. The FIFA Football Agent licence of the appellant, Mr Jonathan Beckett, had been subject to a “provisional suspension” by the FIFA General Secretariat (FIFA GS) (Beckett, para. 35). However, due to the suspension of Article 21 FFAR, it was not possible for the FIFA GS to refer the matter to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee (FIFA DC) – thereby rendering the “provisional suspension” indefinite in its effect.

While the Panel recognised the complex situation in which FIFA continues to find itself as a result of the suspension of certain FFAR provisions, it nonetheless ruled that the FIFA GS could not de facto (in fact) usurp the role of the FIFA DC (para. 97). The Panel held that the imposition of what was, in effect, an indefinite suspension was such a usurpation. The Panel therefore upheld the appeal and ordered that the decision of the FIFA GS be set aside (para. 98).

The award in Beckett drew a clear procedural line: although the FIFA GS may investigate compliance with licensing requirements and form a belief that an agent is ineligible, it cannot substitute itself for the FIFA DC by imposing measures that are disciplinary in nature and definitive in effect.  For a more detailed analysis of Beckett, please see this article on LawInSport^[5].

The more recent award in CAS 2025/A/11173 Tullio Tinti v FIFA^[6] affirmed the position taken by the Panel in Beckett. In Tinti, the Panel underscored the same structural deficiency which affects decisions of the FIFA GS while Article 21 FFAR remains suspended and highlighted how, in those circumstances, attempts by the FIFA GS to enforce eligibility requirements through “provisional” measures risk exceeding the limits of its authority (Tinti, para. 195).

While the factual background in Tinti differs from Beckett in some respects, the core legal question remains essentially the same: how far can FIFA enforce the FFAR when the judicial body designated to take final decisions is not operational?

Article Outline

• Background and regulatory context
  • The FFAR framework and the suspension of Article 21
  • The eligibility rule relied upon
  • The factual background
• Core legal issue: enforcement without a final decision-maker
• The Tinti CAS award: reaffirming procedural boundaries
  • Competence as the starting point
  • “Belief” versus “determination”
  • When ‘provisional’ measures cease to be provisional
  • FIFA’s regulatory vacuum and its consequences
• Why CAS declined to exercise its power of de novo (as new) review
  • Principle of ne ultra petita (let the judge not go beyond the demands of the parties) (para. 182)
  • Re-evaluation of a validly issued licence and the limits of Article 17 FFAR (para. 183-189)
  • The Re-evaluation vs. Ongoing Compliance Distinction
  • Settlement-based sanctions and the scope of Article 5(1)(a)(iii) FFAR (para. 190)
  • Proportionality, temporal distance and the relevance of criminal acquittal (para. 192-193)
  • Investigative limits and the need for adjudication by the competent body (para. 195)
• What Can FIFA Do? Practical Options Going Forward
  • Designation of CAS as competent disciplinary body pending reinstatement of FIFA DC
  • Clarify Article 5 FFAR through interpretation or amendment
  • Introduce temporal proportionality criteria
  • Limit the duration of provisional measures